PSA-2026-04-422GCVE-2026-34577GCVE-125-2026-04-422GApril 19, 2026Unauthenticated Full-Read SSRF via /public/stream Endpoint with Trivially Bypassable Extension Check
Unauthenticated Full-Read SSRF via /public/stream Endpoint with Trivially Bypassable Extension Check
Affected (1)
- gitroomhqpostiz-app
- ≥ 0Fixed in 2.21.3Affected
All other versions: Unaffected
Mitigations
Solutions
- Upgrade to v2.21.3 or later.
Exploits
- Full-Read Access to the internal network.
Overview
The GET /public/stream endpoint in PublicController accepts a user-supplied url query parameter and proxies the full HTTP response back to the caller. The only validation is url.endsWith('mp4'), which is trivially bypassable by appending .mp4 as a query parameter value or URL fragment. The endpoint requires no authentication and has no SSRF protections, allowing an unauthenticated attacker to read responses from internal services, cloud metadata endpoints, and other network-internal resources.
Severity
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N- Attack Vector
- Network
- Attack Complexity
- Low
- Privileges Required
- None
- User Interaction
- None
- Scope
- Changed
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- None
- Availability
- None
Weaknesses (1)
References (3)
Credits (3)
- offsetReporter · @offset
- Enno GelhausCoordinator · @egelhaus
- Nevo DavidRemediation developer · @nevo-david
Context
Impacts
Impacts could include: - Cloud credential theft: An attacker can read AWS/GCP/Azure instance metadata endpoints to steal IAM credentials, service account tokens, and other cloud secrets. This can lead to full cloud account compromise. - Internal network reconnaissance: The attacker can scan and read from internal services (databases, caches, admin panels) that are not exposed to the internet. - Data exfiltration: Any HTTP-accessible internal resource can be read and its content returned to the attacker. - Chaining potential: Stolen cloud credentials or internal service access can be leveraged for lateral movement, privilege escalation, and further exploitation.
Timeline
- 03/28/2026 13:05
Postiz received the initial report of the vulnerability.
- 03/28/2026 16:57
Postiz acknowledged and verified the vulnerability.
- 03/29/2026 07:15
Postiz developed the fix, verified it works, created the release and published the advisory.
- 03/30/2026 17:52
GitHub assigned the CVE CVE-2026-34577 for this advisory.